Consider the following three-person game. Please note this game has incomplete information. Player 1 plays first and chooses either A or B. If player 1 chooses A, then player 2 will play either L or R. If player 2 plays L, then player 3 will play l or r where the payoff for l is (3, 3, 1) and the payoff for r is (0, 0, 0). If player 2 plays R, then player 3 will play either l or r where the payoff for l is (0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 3) for r. Importantly, player 3 does not know what player 2 will play (incomplete information). Furthermore, if player 1 chooses B, then the game is over and the payoffs are (2, 0, 0). Please help me find the perfect Bayesian Equilibria for this game and provide the relevant steps.